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Hong Kong’s Law Reform Commission Green-Lights Outcome Related Fee Structures for Arbitration

Wed, 2021-02-03 01:00

Hong Kong currently prohibits lawyers from using outcome related fee structures (“ORFSs”), including “No-Win, No-Fee” type arrangements, for arbitrations and other contentious matters. This looks set to change for arbitrations, however, following the publication late last year of a compelling Consultation Paper by the Outcome Related Fee Structures for Arbitration Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (the “Sub-committee”).


The Sub-committee’s Recommendations

Hong Kong’s Secretary for Justice first announced that a Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission would consider the introduction of ORFSs for arbitrations during the 2019 Hong Kong Arbitration Week.

The arbitration community welcomed this news since, as previously covered on this blog, reforms to permit the use of ORFSs for arbitrations were arguably overdue in Hong Kong given their potential to enhance access to justice and meet increasing client demand for new methods of funding arbitrations. ORFSs were also already available in other leading arbitral jurisdictions, with the exception of Singapore where reforms are currently being considered.

The Sub-committee’s Consultation Paper was published on 17 December 2020 following an extensive review of the applicable legal regimes regulating ORFSs in other jurisdictions and the arguments for and against the use of ORFSs in arbitration.

The Sub-committee’s headline recommendation is that the law in Hong Kong be amended to permit lawyers, including solicitors, barristers and Registered Foreign Lawyers, to use ORFSs for arbitrations, administered or ad hoc, seated in or outside of Hong Kong. ORFSs would also be available for emergency arbitrator proceedings as well as court and mediation proceedings under Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609).

The Sub-committee’s proposed reforms would therefore allow lawyers in Hong Kong to use ORFSs throughout the entire lifecycle of an arbitration, including for arbitration-related court proceedings such as setting-aside or enforcing awards.

The Sub-committee’s recommendations also address how the ORFS regime should operate in practice with safeguards like caps on the maximum amount payable to lawyers and prohibitions on the recoverability of such amounts from counterparties in the arbitration.


A Sea of Acronyms: CFAs, DBAs and Hybrid DBAs

An eye-catching feature of the Sub-committee’s Consultation Paper is the recommendation that all forms of ORFSs, whether conditional fee agreements (“CFAs”), damages-based agreements (“DBAs”) or hybrid damages-based agreements (“Hybrid DBAs”), be permitted.

CFAs, DBAs (also known as contingency fee arrangements) and Hybrid DBAs are similar in substance with the lawyer receiving a financial benefit if the proceedings are successful. They nevertheless have specific characteristics that arbitration users may wish to choose between:

  • CFAs: the financial benefit is a success fee that can either be an agreed flat fee or calculated as a percentage “uplift” on any legal fees charged to the client during the proceedings. CFAs can be structured as “No-Win, No-Fee” or “No-Win, Low-Fee” arrangements with no legal fees or reduced legal fees, respectively, being due to the lawyer if the proceedings are unsuccessful.
  • DBAs: the financial benefit is calculated by reference to the outcome of the proceedings, for example as a percentage of the sum of damages awarded to or recovered by the client. No legal fees are due to the lawyer if the proceedings are unsuccessful (i.e., “No-Win, No-Fee”).
  • Hybrid DBAs: the financial benefit is calculated in the same manner as a DBA, but the lawyer is additionally entitled to certain legal fees irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings. Legal fees are typically at a discounted hourly rate (i.e., “No-Win, Low-Fee”).

The Sub-committee’s recommendation to allow these three forms of ORFSs deserves applause. Although an argument exists that DBAs are unnecessary if CFAs are available and vice-versa, the Sub-committee rightly concluded that once the view is taken to “cross the Rubicon” by permitting one form of ORFS in Hong Kong, there is no real basis to exclude other forms of ORFSs.1)Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.74. For a strong endorsement of DBAs, and Hybrid DBAs in particular, see Lord Justice Jackson Law Society Speech “Commercial Litigation: The Post-Jackson World”, paragraphs 3.1-3.20. Cf. Victoria Law Reform, Access to Justice— Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Consultation Paper (July 2017), paragraph 8.17. jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_3884_1").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_3884_1", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); From a practical perspective, the Sub-committee’s approach has the advantage of providing arbitration users with the flexibility to select the type of ORFS that best suits their funding needs. (Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.20-4.23)

Relatedly, the Sub-committee’s recommendations recognise the potential for respondents, rather than just claimants, to use ORFSs. The Consultation Paper gives an example of a DBA being structured to provide for a lawyer to receive a financial benefit if the damages awarded against their client fall below an agreed amount. (paragraph 5.73, 5.74(b)(iii), Recommendation 13(h)) Such flexibility would be welcomed by arbitration users.

The Sub-committee’s proposed reforms compare favourably to the approach to ORFSs in other leading arbitral jurisdictions. In England & Wales, for example, CFAs and DBAs are permitted but, despite convincing criticisms of the illogical nature of their exclusion, Hybrid DBAs are not.2)Lord Justice Jackson Law Society Speech “Commercial Litigation: The Post-Jackson World”, paragraphs 3.6, 3.13. 3.14; The 2019 DBA Reform Project: Explanatory Memorandum (October 2019), pages 14-15; Consultation Paper, paragraphs 4.97, 5.50, 5.51. jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_3884_2").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_3884_2", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); Singapore’s proposed reforms would permit CFAs but not DBAs or Hybrid DBAs.3)Singapore’s Ministry of Law Consultation Paper on Conditional Fee Agreements, August 2019, paragraphs 1, 2, 7. jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_3884_3").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_3884_3", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] });


Should ORFSs be Allowed in Hong Kong?

The Sub-committee’s Consultation Paper puts forward a strong case for allowing lawyers in Hong Kong to enter into ORFSs with their clients. Indeed, the Sub-committee identifies such reform as essential to preserving Hong Kong’s continued status as one of the world’s leading arbitral seats and to maintaining its competitiveness. (Consultation Paper, paragraphs 4.4, 4.8-4.10) This reflects not only the significant demand from clients for ORFSs but the fact that nearly all of the arbitral seats with which Hong Kong competes, such as London, Paris, Geneva, New York and Mainland China, already permit some form of ORFS (with Singapore likely to join them in the near future). (Consultation Paper, paragraphs 3.2, 4.4, 4.10) Jurisdictions vying to position themselves as alternative arbitration seats have also embraced ORFSs; most recently with the Cayman Islands introducing legislation in January 2021 to permit contingency fees.

Allowing lawyers in Hong Kong to use ORFSs would enable them to compete on a level playing field with lawyers in other jurisdictions. (Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.27) In contrast, if “Hong Kong continues to prevent its Lawyers from sharing [the risk of arbitration] through ORFSs, it is likely that clients will simply choose to arbitrate elsewhere”. (Consultation Paper, paragraphs 4.4)

The Sub-committee also recognised that ORFSs would enhance access to justice in Hong Kong by allowing clients to fund claims that they may otherwise be unable to bring. (Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.11-4.14.) Although Third Party Funding is now allowed in Hong Kong, the Sub-committee rightly acknowledged that not every case is suitable for it and Third-Party Funding can be difficult to obtain in practice even where the merits of a claim are strong. ORFSs would help to fill this gap.

With respect to the risks commonly associated with ORFSs, such as conflicts of interest between lawyers and their clients, excessive legal fees and increases in frivolous claims, the Sub-committee drew on the experience of other leading arbitral jurisdictions that already allow ORFSs to convincingly conclude that such concerns were misplaced in the context of arbitration or otherwise capable of being managed by implementing safeguards in the relevant laws and regulations to control how they operate in practice. (Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.2-4.3)

In terms of next steps, the Sub-committee has invited public views on the appropriate safeguards to be put in place in lawyer’s professional codes of conduct and subsidiary legislation regarding the use of ORFSs, as well as the recommendations in the Consultation Paper more generally, as part of a consultation that runs until 16 March 2021. Hopefully the Sub-committee’s recommendations will be finalized and promptly implemented in Hong Kong following the conclusion of this consultation.



The Sub-committee’s Consultation Paper presents a compelling case for allowing CFAs, DBAs and Hybrid DBAs to be used in arbitrations and arbitration-related court proceedings. Such reforms would, if implemented, help safeguard Hong Kong’s status as one of the world’s leading arbitral seats.

It will be interesting to see whether Singapore’s proposed ORFS reforms remain limited to CFAs or develop in due course to cover DBAs and Hybrid DBAs.

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ Consultation Paper, paragraph 4.74. For a strong endorsement of DBAs, and Hybrid DBAs in particular, see Lord Justice Jackson Law Society Speech “Commercial Litigation: The Post-Jackson World”, paragraphs 3.1-3.20. Cf. Victoria Law Reform, Access to Justice— Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Consultation Paper (July 2017), paragraph 8.17. 2. ↑ Lord Justice Jackson Law Society Speech “Commercial Litigation: The Post-Jackson World”, paragraphs 3.6, 3.13. 3.14; The 2019 DBA Reform Project: Explanatory Memorandum (October 2019), pages 14-15; Consultation Paper, paragraphs 4.97, 5.50, 5.51. 3. ↑ Singapore’s Ministry of Law Consultation Paper on Conditional Fee Agreements, August 2019, paragraphs 1, 2, 7. function footnote_expand_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").show(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("-"); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").hide(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("+"); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container() { if (jQuery("#footnote_references_container").is(":hidden")) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container(); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery("#" + p_str_TargetID); if(l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight/2 }, 1000); } }More from our authors: International Arbitration and the COVID-19 Revolution
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2020 in Review: The Year of Virtual Hearings

Tue, 2021-02-02 00:36

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 public health crisis, a seismic event in history, many of us feel as if 2020 is the year that did not happen. While it certainly was not business as usual, in a display of flexibility and resilience, the arbitration community ensured that the (virtual) show did go on. With 2020 now concluded, we reflect on the year’s hot topic: virtual hearings (or remote hearings, see more on the issue of terminology here and here).

As a globalized profession, remote communications have already formed part of the arbitration process, ranging from procedural conferences by phone to some sort of remote participation in hearings, such as notably witnesses being examined by videoconference (see for example, a post from 2018 outlining the features and possibilities of such online proceedings).

However, uncertainty, travel restrictions, and health protocols introduced due to the COVID-19 pandemic functioned as a catalyst to change industry standards and users’ decision making. As pointed out by Professor Maxi Scherer, parties, counsel, and tribunals faced the reality that a physical hearing was not possible to take place at the scheduled time. Despite prior expectations and arrangements users faced a dilemma: “should [the hearings] (cautiously) be postponed, or (proactively) be held remotely using modern communication technologies”? This sparked wide discussion on and use of virtual hearings, and unsurprisingly, virtual hearings are already the subject of scholarly work and in-depth study. Such efforts include ICCA’s recently launched research project on whether the right to a physical hearing exists and the 2020 School of International Arbitration (SIA), Queen Mary University of London (QMUL) Survey, which carries the theme “Adapting Arbitration to a Changing World.”

Here, we shed light on our coverage of the following related issues: the complex practical and legal issues that need to be addressed in the context of remote hearings, the guidance that has been offered by arbitral institutions, the physical and psychological challenges presented by the increase of video conferencing, as well as the potential impact on the promotion of diversity and sustainability.


Addressing the Practical and Legal Challenges

Nothing is easy about virtual hearings. Counsel, arbitrators, witnesses, and experts may be located all over the world, rendering it impossible to find a “convenient” timetable to conduct the proceedings. Even after a timetable has been agreed, further challenges including selecting an appropriate video conferencing platform (that considers security and confidentiality needs) determining an appropriate means to share information, documents, and evidence; and arranging for real-time transcription.

Jacky Fung addressed these challenges as counsel in a hearing involving eight global cities and nearly a dozen witnesses and insightfully recommended that an agreed “virtual hearing protocol” could ensure virtual hearings succeed. On the other hand, Chahat Chawla offered the institutional perspective based on two successful and distinct SIAC arbitrations: an emergency arbitrator hearing for urgent interim relief and an evidentiary hearing. He suggested users focus on three aspects: (1) developing best practices; (2) conducting a practice round, e.g., a “test call” or “dry run”; and (3) employing reliable technology. A tailored procedural order could also help ensure success. However, such a procedural order could not exist without technologically adept arbitrators leading the way, a quality that we may see taken into account in future arbitral appointments.

Users must also consider the ethical and legal framework for their hearings to ensure virtual success. Could arbitral awards rendered based on virtual hearing be at greater risk of set aside at the enforcement phase? The Vis Moot is infamous for asking students (and their coaches and mock arbitrators) to consider current industry challenges, and so this precise legal issue appears in this year’s Vis Moot problem. The problem asks whether, in a pandemic environment, a virtual hearing involving the presentation of witness testimony would be appropriate over one party’s objection. It could be argued that virtual hearings violate due process, especially where one party objects and demands an in-person hearing for cross-examination. Virtual hearings may also exacerbate pre-existing inequality between parties.

While the challenges may seem novel, they are merely the most modern iteration of due process paranoia. On the Blog we have previously highlighted views from various jurisdictions, including Colombia, England, India, Malaysia, and Singapore. In the COVID-19 context, some jurisdictions have already articulated clear views. In July 2020, the Austrian Supreme Court confirmed a tribunal’s power to hold a virtual hearing over one party’s objection, thereby rejecting due process concerns. In August 2020, a U.S. district court reached a similar conclusion. More generally, in October 2020, an Egyptian court offered its blessing to virtual hearings.


Guidance from Arbitral Institutions

Arbitral institutions have also actively sought to address users’ needs. In hopes of developing best practice tools, several arbitral institutions issued guidelines and hearing protocols, such as for example the ICC Guidance Note on Possible Measures Aimed at Mitigating the Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic (discussed here), the Vienna International Arbitration Centre (VIAC) Protocol, the ICSID Guide to Online Hearings, the LCA Guidance on remote hearings, and the HKIAC Guidelines on Virtual Hearings.

In addition to the individual efforts made by each institution, the crisis sparked collaboration across arbitral institutions, including the April 2020 Joint Statement on “Arbitration and COVID-19” in which major arbitral institutions urged flexibility and collaboration (see also here).

In 2020, the LCIA also updated its rules. As discussed in a post following their publication, the rules clearly reflect the impact of the pandemic on international arbitration by addressing virtual hearings in greater detail. Similarly, at the end of 2020, the ICC also released its 2021 Rules of Arbitration, which leave no doubt as to a tribunal’s powers to conduct virtual hearings (see relatedly the discussion of the new rules here).


Healthy Virtual Hearings

Even with a trove of guidance now available, the necessary and rapid adoption of virtual hearings does not come without a cost. Sophie Nappert and Mihaela Apostol discussed the physical and psychological challenges presented by the increase of video conferencing in professional life, with an emphasis on virtual hearings. They explored the various difficulties that participants in video-gatherings experience. Among the various challenges they identified, and in addition to physical tiredness, they discussed in detail mental challenges because of screen fatigue. They called for increased awareness in relation to the tangible consequences of virtual hearings on practitioners’ minds and bodies. Moreover, and in agreement with other contributors, they recommended the adoption of best practices at the earliest stages of arbitral proceedings.


Sustainability and Diversity in a Virtual World

As the arbitration industry matures, voices arguing in favour of promoting sustainability and diversity have increased. Virtual platforms in the post-COVID-19-world may offer greater opportunities. Maguelonne de Brugiere and Cherine Foty approached these two heavily-debated issues in the “newly virtual world of international arbitration.” They argued that the pandemic has functioned as a “natural accelerator” “for the many behavioral changes” that initiatives, such as the Campaign for Greener Arbitrations have sought to promote. As envisaged, in years to come, we will see behavioral changes in relation to traveling. In addition to more “environmentally-conscious” traveling, they emphasized the potential for reduction of material waste in arbitral proceedings by using electronic means of communication.

On the diversity side, in this new virtual world, there might be opportunities for increased visibility and participation for previously underrepresented categories (such as women and minorities). As highlighted by Ibrahim Godofa and Mercy Okiro, event organizers now have a more global and accessible pool of candidates participating as speakers in panels, while on the other side, global attendees may now also have greater access to such high quality programming and networking opportunities. This is truly a silver lining for the arbitration community; however, the news might not be equally good for diversity among virtual hearing participants. Maguelonne de Brugiere and Cherine Foty warned that many skilled practitioners might lack the necessary technological infrastructure to cope with the high demands of a virtual hearing. There is certainly more to add to this list of bad news. For example, there is the further risk that well-established arbitrators could utilize the flexibility offered by virtual hearings (and less traveling or time zone limitations) to accept significantly more appointments (the so-called 24-hour arbitrator problem). The risk is simply that these savvy and seasoned arbitrators could get a larger part of the pie of international disputes, decreasing opportunities available to the younger generation of arbitrators.


Concluding Remarks 

Will arbitration ever be the same again? This was considered in depth during the 32nd Annual ITA Workshop and Annual Meeting and the resounding view was that our industry, like many others, has been indelibly impacted by the unprecedented rise of virtual work. Indeed, Gary Benton foresees a ”sea change” for our community. But are virtual hearings here to stay? Luke Nottage considers that whether the COVID-19 pandemic will be a long-term game changer for international arbitration remains open. What we can safely predict is that during 2021 we will see further developments in the realm of remote hearings, as this pandemic heralds a new era in many respects, including for the use of technology in international arbitration.

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The Renewable Energy Saga from Charanne v. Spain to The PV Investors v. Spain: Trying to See the Wood for the Trees

Mon, 2021-02-01 03:08

In the early 2000s, several European states introduced generous incentive programs to attract investors to renewable energy, triggering an investment boom. In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, however, the incentive payments put a strain on regulators. The subsequent changes to the regulations of the renewable energy sector implemented by Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic have sparked a considerable number of arbitrations against these states.

This contribution seeks to bring clarity to the 28 arbitral awards brought against Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic (as of February 2020). Specifically, it will argue that these awards fit a typology made up of three different lines of reasoning, depending on their conclusions regarding the alleged frustration of legitimate expectations.



Each of the renewable energy regulations adopted by the three states had a two-tier structure:

  1. the framework laws guaranteed investors “reasonable profitability rates” (Spain), a “fair return” (Italy) or a certain payback period (Czech Republic); and
  2. implementing legislation specified the exact feed-in tariffs which were at the heart of the incentive programs.

Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic each rolled back their incentive schemes. Italy and the Czech Republic reduced the feed-in tariffs. Spain, by contrast, chose a two-stage process: the measures preceding the first half of 2013 constituted relatively cautious modifications whereas the changes from July 2013 onwards abolished the fixed feed-in tariffs.

As a result, the three states faced a wave of arbitral proceedings, mainly on the basis of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (to which reforms are currently being discussed), with the investors arguing a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard due to a frustration of their legitimate expectations. The key legal question in this context was: what legitimate expectations can general legislation give rise to?

The 28 arbitral awards from Charanne v. Spain to The PV Investors v. Spain did not give a uniform answer to this question. Rather, these awards can be divided into three different lines of reasoning, which are examined in the paragraphs that follow.


First Line of Reasoning – All State Measures Frustrated Legitimate Expectations

The first line of reasoning was followed by 5 tribunals and 4 dissenting opinions. The tribunals (and dissenting opinions) offered three different lines of analysis concerning this first line of reasoning.

The tribunal in Masdar v. Spain contrasted two investment scenarios: one with and one without a specific commitment as to the stability of the legal framework. If the host state had given a specific commitment, an investor could legitimately expect that the legal framework would not be modified contrary to such commitment. By contrast, without a specific commitment, an investor could only expect that the host state would refrain from unreasonable or unjustified changes. However, the tribunal then avoided the central legal question of whether general legislation could constitute a specific commitment as it found that Spain had provided other specific commitments.

A number of tribunals and dissenting opinions following Masdar equated generally applicable legislation with a specific commitment, invoking the wording and object and purpose of the respective laws to find they had been deliberately implemented to attract investors (9REN v. Spain; OperaFund v. Spain; Greentech v. Italy; Antaris v. Czech Republic, Dissenting Opinion of Mr Gary Born; Wirtgen v. Czech Republic, Dissenting Opinion of Mr Gary Born). Accordingly, the regulatory changes in Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic were found to have frustrated the investors’ legitimate expectations.

Prima facie, CEF v. Italy does not fall within this line of reasoning. For instance, the tribunal emphasized that without a specific commitment, investors’ expectations had to be balanced against host states’ right to regulate. Yet, it argued that Italy had undoubtedly committed to paying constant feed-in tariffs. Therefore, the cut-back frustrated legitimate expectations. Implicitly, then, the tribunal treated Italy’s legislation as a specific commitment.

Lastly, the dissenting opinions in Charanne and Isolux maintained that while laws were not equivalent to a specific commitment, they could nonetheless give rise to a legitimate expectation that they would not be changed to the detriment of foreign investors.


Second Line of Reasoning – Only the Later Spanish Measures Frustrated Legitimate Expectations

The second line of reasoning was followed by 10 tribunals. These tribunals viewed only the later Spanish measures – i.e. the abolition of the fixed feed-in tariffs and their replacement by a significantly less generous remuneration regime – as a frustration of legitimate expectations, offering two different lines of argument.

One group argued that a regulatory framework per se did not contain a specific commitment. Therefore, investors could not legitimately expect that the legal framework be frozen. Nonetheless, investors could expect that when changing regulations, a state would not act “unreasonably, disproportionately or contrary to the public interest” (Charanne v. Spain; similarly Blusun v. Italy; SolEs v. Spain; Antin v. Spain) or that changes would not be “total and unreasonable” (Eiser v. Spain; similarly Foresight v. Spain; Novenergia II v. Spain; NextEra v. Spain). Thus, while the tribunals in Charanne (dealing only with parts of the earlier Spanish measures) and Blusun denied a frustration of legitimate expectations, those in SolEs, Antin, Eiser, Foresight, Novenergia II, and NextEra found that Spain had contravened legitimate expectations by abolishing the fixed feed-in tariffs.

The second group argued that general legislation could contain commitments to regulatory stability. However, the resulting legitimate expectations were limited in scope: a host state frustrated them only if it significantly altered the economic basis of investments made in reliance upon such legislation (Cube v. Spain; similar approach in Watkins v. Spain).

Importantly, while the tribunals following the second line of reasoning were divided over whether a regulatory framework could be equivalent to a specific commitment, they agreed that investors could not expect general legislation to remain unchanged. Rather, modifications had to reach the threshold of unreasonableness or disproportionality or call into question the economic basis of an investment to defeat legitimate expectations.


Third Line of Reasoning – Legitimate Expectations Were Confined to a Reasonable Return

The tribunals following the third line of reasoning argued that investors could not expect to be paid the fixed feed-in tariffs specified in the implementing legislation. Rather, their only legitimate expectation was a reasonable return (as the framework laws had promised). As long as they received such return, the host state had not contravened legitimate expectations.

The third line of reasoning was followed by 13 tribunals. Again, these tribunals presented three different lines of argument. However, unlike those following the first and second lines of reasoning, tribunals following the third line had to deal with quite heterogenous facts.

The tribunals in Isolux v. Spain, Antaris v. Czech Republic, and Belenergia v. Italy shared the premise of the first group in the second line (Charanne etc.) that general legislation could in principle give rise to legitimate expectations. Yet, as the investors had invested relatively late – when the unsustainability of the incentive schemes had become obvious – they could only expect a reasonable return. As the investors received such return, these tribunals dismissed the investors’ frustration of legitimate expectations claim.

By contrast, according to the tribunals in The PV Investors v. Spain, Stadtwerke v. Spain, BayWa v. Spain, and Wirtgen v. Czech Republic, investors could only legitimately expect a reasonable return from the outset; and that legislative amendments would not be unreasonable, arbitrary or disproportionate. At this point, the tribunals in The PV Investors, Stadtwerke, and BayWa addressed the substance of the regulatory changes and sought to balance the competing interests of foreign investors and host states. Because the investors in Wirtgen, Stadtwerke, and BayWa still achieved a reasonable return, their legitimate expectations had not been contravened. Conversely, in The PV Investors some claimant entities were denied a reasonable return contrary to legitimate expectations.

Similarly, the tribunal in RWE v. Spain did not view general legislation as a specific commitment and therefore dismissed the frustration of legitimate expectations claim. However, it examined the proportionality of the regulatory changes, likewise focusing on their substance. It concluded that they represented an excessive burden on some of the investors’ power plants, were to that extent disproportionate, and therefore violated fair and equitable treatment.

Lastly, some tribunals combined the reasoning in Isolux etc. and The PV Investors etc., arguing that the legislation had promised only a reasonable return – all the more so as the claimants had invested late (RREEF v. Spain; Photovoltaic Knopf v. Czech Republic; Voltaic v. Czech Republic; I.C.W. v. Czech Republic; WA v. Czech Republic). Only in RREEF did the host state renege on that promise.



These awards fit a continuum, with the first line of reasoning fiercely defending investors’ rights and the third line giving legitimate expectations the comparatively narrowest scope. Can the different approaches be reconciled?

Concerning the first and second lines of reasoning, the tribunals following the respective arguments seemingly shared the same premise as to whether general legislation could or could not constitute a commitment to stability. Yet, they reached different conclusions on the frustration of legitimate expectations by attaching different meanings to key terms.

For example, the tribunals in the first line of reasoning that equated general legislation to a specific commitment (9REN etc.) agreed with Cube in the second line that generally applicable legislation could contain a commitment to stability. Nonetheless, they broadened the scope of the legitimate expectations: in their view, investors could legitimately expect that the host state would not enact any adverse changes. Hence, the first line of reasoning implicitly gave a broader meaning to the term “commitment” than did the tribunal in Cube.

Similarly, the view in the first line of reasoning that laws, while not a specific commitment, could create legitimate expectations had a counterpart in the second line (Charanne etc.). Again, the first line of reasoning gave a different spin to a key term, namely to “legitimate expectations”: according to the first line, investors could legitimately expect that there would be no disadvantageous changes to the regulations, whereas pursuant to the second line, they could only expect that changes would not be unreasonable or disproportionate.

With respect to the first two lines of reasoning and the third line, the main divergence relates to the two-tier structure of the regulations (especially the Spanish one): the third line considered the framework laws and not the implementing legislation to be decisive for legitimate expectations. Consequently, according to the third line, investors could not expect to receive fixed feed-in tariffs, but only to earn a reasonable return. Therefore, in particular the abolition of those tariffs through the later Spanish measures did not as such frustrate legitimate expectations, but only if investors were deprived of such return.

Overall, then, the three lines do not give the same scope to legitimate expectations created by general legislation. Nonetheless, the awards fit a typology made up of three different lines of reasoning; in other words, we can still see the wood for the trees.



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The Contents of Journal of International Arbitration, Volume 38, Issue 1 (February 2021)

Sun, 2021-01-31 21:46

We are happy to inform you that the latest issue of the journal is now available and includes the following contributions:


Sundaresh Menon, Arbitration’s Blade: International Arbitration and the Rule of Law

The legitimacy of a system of dispute resolution depends intrinsically on the trust and confidence of its users in its decision-making processes, and that in turn rests on the general adherence of those processes to the values and principles that constitute the rule of law. While international arbitration has long been a close partner of the courts in sustaining the rule of law, some of arbitration’s key features and practices – such as its consent-based limitations, its predisposition toward confidentiality, its longstanding practice of permitting parties to unilaterally appoint arbitrators, and its philosophy that parties have no right to a right answer – mean that arbitration supports an attenuated model of the rule of law. That is largely the result of conscious decisions to forgo certain rule of law values in order to realize other goals. But the problem of rising costs and delays, underpinned by arbitration’s growing procedural rigidity and lack of agility, exacts a heavy price on arbitration’s users and their confidence in arbitration, without obvious returns. We must be cognizant of arbitration’s sacrifice in terms of rule of law values when seeking to advance other objectives, and regularly reflect on whether those gains are still worth their cost.


Kevin Ongenae & Maud Piers, Procedural Formalities in Arbitration: Towards a Technologically Neutral Legal Framework

This article addresses the ongoing process of digitalization in arbitration proceedings, particularly in light of the recent coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. It focuses on the different communications that occur throughout arbitration proceedings, i.e. written communication at the start and during the proceedings, oral communication at hearings, and the rendering of the arbitral award. The authors assess the past, present and future use of digital means of communication in relation to each of these instances, and analyse the extent to which the applicable legal framework (institutional rules, national laws, and the New York Convention) is actually an obstacle to digitalization. They find that the evolution towards more technologically oriented proceedings had already started, but that the COVID-19 pandemic will likely be a decisive step towards fully digital arbitration proceedings. The authors welcome that evolution, and argue that there are no overriding legal or policy arguments to hold back this trend.


Chiann Bao, Return to Reason: Reigning in Runaway Due Process Claims

This article will explore the Singapore Court of Appeal’s recent decision in China Machine New Energy Corp. v. Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC. Offering welcome guidance regarding due process under Singapore law, this judgment clarifies the rights available to parties for a ‘full opportunity’ to present their cases. From the individual procedural decisions made by the arbitral tribunal to the cumulative effect of such decisions, the Singapore court dissects the various acts that might not have met the expected procedural fairness standard, as well as the Respondent’s failure to object in a timely manner, and concludes that the arbitral tribunal did not violate the Respondent’s right to due process. Recognising the wide latitude in balancing procedural fairness and efficiency of process bestowed upon arbitral tribunals, Chief Justice Menon sends a strong message that makes unequivocally clear that the standard for granting a set aside application is high and any abuse of due process protection is not to be tolerated under Singapore law.


Joséphine Hage Chahine, UN and EU Sanctions Versus US Sanctions: Two Different Yardsticks Commentary on the Decision of the Paris Court of Appeal (International Commercial Chamber) (5th Pole, Chamber 16) of 3 June 2020, No. 21/2020

The Paris Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to an ICC award rendered in favour of an Iranian government-owned company. That challenge was based on allegations of breaches by the tribunal of due process, of the arbitrators’ mandate, and of public policy. Of note, the public policy challenge was based on the tribunal’s alleged failure to take into consideration UN, EU and US sanctions against Iran. This decision of the Paris Court of Appeal is in line with the established French case law regarding its answer to the above mentioned three grounds of challenge, but it drew a peculiar conclusion that US sanctions, contrary to UN and EU sanctions, are not part of French international public policy, even though having the same object.


Bankole Sodipo, Enforceability of Awards Vitiated by Illegality and Fair Hearing: A Review from a Nigerian Law Perspective of PID v. FRN

This article reviews, from a Nigerian law perspective, the judgment of the English court and the majority arbitral award in Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. (PID) v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). The arbitral tribunal awarded record-breaking damages, totalling over USD 9 billion, inclusive of interest. The award relates to an alleged breach by the FRN of a Gas Supply and Processing Agreement (GSPA) to a facility that was never constructed by PID. The signatory of the GSPA, PID, was a British Virgin Island corporation. Although PID had incorporated a local PID Corporation in Nigeria (PID Nigeria), it never executed the GSPA. This article is divided into three sections. Section 1 features the introduction and a general commentary. Section 2 focuses on the second leg of the FRN’s objection: ‘Whether or not the Claimant failed to comply with the provisions of section 54 of the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 as alleged, and if so whether the GSPA is void, and/or affected by illegality, as a result’. This article does not discuss the first leg of the FRN’s objection, namely, the capacity of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources to contract on behalf of the FRN. Section 3 examines the consequences of the order issued by the Federal High Court of Nigeria (FHC) on FRN’s application, restraining the parties from proceeding with the arbitral hearing, which the tribunal ignored. It considers whether the order can bind members of the tribunal who were not parties to the FHC action; if it was proper for the tribunal to ignore the order; and the consequences of the order on the FRN. It analyses whether the principle of fair hearing was breached when the tribunal reached a determination on the issue of the seat of arbitration without taking further submissions from the parties.


Arpan Banerjee & Ashwin Murthy, Rand Investments v. Republic of Serbia: Transparency and the Limits of Consent

International investment law has consistently grappled with the issue of transparency. While the need for increased transparency in the practice of investment tribunals is generally recognized in principle, in practice the application of transparency norms often raises contentious issues. One common issue is the appropriateness of transparent proceedings where the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) governing the dispute is silent on the matter. A further, more vexed question arises when claimants proceed under multiple BITs with disparate transparency obligations. This situation arose in Rand Investments v. Republic of Serbia, where the claimants instituted an arbitration under both the Canada-Serbia and the Cyprus- Serbia BITs. Noting that the Cyprus-Serbia BIT was silent on the question of transparency, the Majority held that the transparency provisions of the Canada-Serbia BIT could be applied to the entire arbitration on grounds of procedural efficiency. However, the respondent’s arbitrator dissented, finding that the Majority’s approach violated Serbia’s consent and sovereignty. Upon examining the dichotomous approaches adopted by the Majority and the Dissenting Arbitrator, this case comment offers an insight into the potential implications of the case on future investment arbitrations involving multiple BITs with disparate transparency obligations.

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2020 in Review: Arbitration-related Developments in France

Sun, 2021-01-31 00:26

The pandemic did not prevent French courts from bringing their share of arbitration-related developments, although they remained almost inactive from March to June. This post succinctly reviews some of 2020’s noteworthy developments.


Important Decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal’s International Section

Operational since March 2018, the International Chamber of the Paris court of appeal (“ICCP-CA”) now hears all annulment proceedings of Paris-seated international arbitral awards.


Dommo: French Courts Continue to Examine Arbitrators’ Most Tenuous Connections

In Dommo, the ICCP-CA was called to rule on links between a law firm affiliated with the arbitrator’s former firm and a party’s shareholder.

Although the decision makes clear that these links are to be disclosed as per Article 1456(2) of the French Civil Code of Procedure (“CCP”), annulment was denied on the ground that such failure to disclose did not raise in the parties’ mind “a reasonable doubt as to the independence and impartiality” of the arbitrator.

The ICCP-CA relied on the fact that (i) the undisclosed link was indirect, (ii) the controversial relationship had stopped two years before the start of the arbitration, and (iii) it was not established that the arbitrator had ever acted as counsel nor assisted the shareholders, thereby confirming French courts’ well-balanced assessment of the issue, although the links under scrutiny are more and more tenuous (see recently, links between an arbitrators’ firm and a party’s affiliate in the 2019 Volkswagen case).

The ICCP-CA attempted to define each of the three criteria on which French courts traditionally rely (i.e. the well-known (‘notoire’) nature of the circumstance, its link with the dispute, and its impact on the arbitrator’s judgment), but the applicable test would deserve further clarification. The lack of clarity as to the determination of a “reasonable doubt” is not specific to French courts, as illustrated by the recent UK Supreme Court decision in the Halliburton case (see discussion here).


Samwell: Arbitrators’ Power to Assess Corruption Allegations

After having strengthened its control of arbitral awards involving corruption in both the 2017 Belokon and 2018 Alstom cases, the Court further clarified its approach in Samwell.

Although corruption is most often addressed on public policy grounds, the challenge was raised under the violation of the arbitrator’s mandate (Article 1520(3) CCP). It was contended that the arbitrator erred in exercising its mandate to apply French law by relying on other corruption criteria than those previously endorsed by French courts.

The Court denied the request, ruling that the application by the arbitral tribunal of other criteria, be they inspired from the 1977 FCPA red flags, did not indicate that it had applied US law. The Court added that the Alstom criteria were not exhaustive under French law.

While preserving the arbitrators’ freedom in their assessment of corruption, this decision also suggests that corruption should be exclusively assessed on the basis of the applicable law as determined by the parties’ agreement.


TCM v. NGSC: Economic Sanctions and International Arbitration

Frustration at the recent Court of Cassation’s ruling in Finmeccanica – where the Court failed to take a clear stance on whether implementation measures for the UN embargo against Iraq formed part of international public policy under Article 1520(5) CCP – resulted in high expectations on the impact of international sanctions on the validity and enforcement of awards issued by French-seated arbitral tribunals.

In TCM v NGSC, the ICCP-CA rejected TCM’s claim that the award was contrary to international public policy based on the arbitrators’ failure to consider the impact of international sanctions against Iran upon the termination of the contract.

For the first time, the Paris Court ruled that UN and EU sanctions – which aimed at “contributing to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security” – were mandatory rules integrated into the French conception of international public policy. This was contrasted with US sanctions, which could not be regarded “as an expression of international consensus”, especially considering EU and French opposition to their extraterritorial reach.


Stay of Enforcement: Towards a More Restrictive Approach?

Since the 2019 Oschadbank case, the Paris CA relies on an in concreto restrictive approach and tends to focus on economic arguments to assess whether enforcement is “likely to seriously infringe upon one party’s rights” under Article 1526(2) CCP. It remained unclear, however, whether the Court could take into account non-economic criteria. Decisions rendered in 2020 have not clarified the issue.

Whereas a focus on economic arguments was suggested in CSPI, the ICCP-CA expressly stated in Sanofi and EPPOF that Article 1526 CCPdoes not only limit its benefit to an assessment of the sole economic consequences of the enforcement”. Yet, these decisions confirm the preponderance of economic considerations, such as:

– the creditworthiness of the debtor (CSPI, Sanofi, EPPOF) and the creditor (CSPI, Sanofi);

– the creditor categorization as a foreign offshore company without employees and infrastructures (CSPI);

– the uncertainty arising out of the fact that the parties successively prevailed in two awards (CSPI).

On the contrary, the Court deemed as irrelevant: the debtor’s absence of cash flow (EPPOF); difficulties relating to (i) the singularity of the debtor’s activity and revenues, and (ii) the Covid-19 crisis (EPPOF); the debtor’s alleged fraudulent conduct; the debtor’s location abroad; as well as legal uncertainty arising out of enforcement (Sanofi).


PwC: Balancing Compétence-Compétence with Consumer Protection

As previously described, the Court of Cassation upheld a CA ruling that declined, in a dispute involving a consumer, to refer the parties to arbitration based on the arbitration agreement’s characterisation as an unfair term. The Court held that the appeal judges did not breach Article 1448 CCP – enshrining the compétence-compétence principle – by ensuring “the full effectiveness of European consumer protection law”.

In doing so, the Court remarkably departed from its previous case law – set out in the Jaguar and Rado case – according to which the compétence-compétence principle was equally applicable in disputes involving a consumer. Consumers were accordingly required to initiate arbitration to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement.

The Court of Cassation thus introduced a new exception to the negative effect of the compétence-compétence when the dispute involves a consumer and EU law is applicable. It remains to be seen whether this solution will be extended to non-EU consumers disputes.


(Only) Two Annulments of Investment Arbitration Awards

While 2019 proved to be a turbulent year with regard to investment arbitration (6 decisions rendered over a total of 20 since the first one in 2008), 2020 remained moderate.

The first case is the last episode of the Garcia Armas saga. In this new decision, the CA upheld its prior interpretation of Article 1(2) of the Spain-Venezuela BITi.e. the investor’s nationality at the time of its investment is relevant for jurisdiction ratione materiae – while setting aside the jurisdictional award in its entirety. By doing so, the French annulment judge confirmed that a special meaning is to be drawn from the definition of protected investments as assets “invested by investors”.

The same reasoning was applied in Pugachev v Russia to interpret Article 1(2) the France-Russia BIT for jurisdiction ratione personae purposes, holding that the treaty required the investor to have held French nationality at the time of the making of his investments in Russia.

In Sorelec v Libya, the CA annulled a partial award that recorded a settlement between the parties, based on circumstantial evidence that enforcement of the award would give effect to a transaction tainted by corruption. Remarkably, the corrupt scheme had not been alleged by the parties before the arbitral tribunal.

The evidence of corruption upheld by the Court is as much exogenous – the political context in Libya – as endogenous to the disputed agreement, namely the Minister’s non-compliance with Libyan administrative procedures, the lack of evidence of negotiations preceding its signature, and its very favourable terms for the foreign investor.

Interestingly, the ICCP-CA had found two weeks earlier in Benin v Securiport that there was no sufficient evidence of corruption, notably because the contract at stake had been negotiated for almost three years.

This decision further confirms the Court’s willingness to tackle corruption by using the “red flags” methodology as in the Alstom case – already discussed in a previous post –, allowing heightened scrutiny of awards on public policy grounds, including the review of all relevant facts.

Finally, the Court of Cassation made clear in Schooner v. Poland that the waiver under Article 1466 CCP did not preclude investors from presenting new arguments on jurisdiction before the annulment judge, as long as the issue of jurisdiction had been argued before the arbitral tribunal.

This certainly is an important ruling, as it makes plain that the annulment judge’s de novo review of jurisdiction as per Article 1520(1) CCP is to be conducted even with new arguments, and not only within the boundaries of what had been argued before the arbitral tribunal.


Kout Food: French Courts’ Centred Approach as to the Law Applicable to the Arbitration Agreement

As previously described, the Paris CA upheld an ICC award after ruling that absent an express choice as to the law applicable to the arbitration clause, the lex arbitri applies to issues relating to the extension of the clause to non-signatories. The Court ruled so despite the fact that the relevant contracts all provided for the application of English law to the contract and an appeal court in London had previously refused enforcement of the award precisely because English law applied to the arbitration agreement, thereby confirming its centred approach on the issue.


Noteworthy Enforcement-Related Decisions

Enforcement proceedings arising out of the Commissimpex saga continue to generate interesting developments with regards to the application of the 2016 Sapin II statute, and especially Article L.111-1-3 of the French Civil Enforcement Code granting immunity from execution to assets “used or intended to be used in the exercise of the functions of the diplomatic mission of foreign States” or assets “assigned to a diplomatic protection”.

The Court considered that the Congolese presidential aircraft, temporarily in France for maintenance purposes, could not fulfil these conditions, since (i) the on-board personnel and maintenance of the aircraft were carried out by third parties, (ii) the flight log listed only one international flight unrelated to diplomatic activity and (iii) the president routinely used another aircraft, thereby confirming a pragmatic assessment of this condition.

More recently, the Court of Cassation endorsed the position that enforcement measures served on a foreign bank’s French branch towards funds located abroad have no effect where the debtor has no accounts at the French branch. In other words, the seized third-party shall have a registered office or a branch in France able to pay the sums owed by the debtor.



The developments outlined in this post remain in line with the French courts’ approach towards international arbitration which, ten years after the last reform of French arbitration law, remains liberal despite the strengthening of their intervention.

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Bid Challenges: What Role Can Arbitration Play in Tender Disputes?

Sat, 2021-01-30 01:01

Competitive tendering for construction and engineering contracts is an essential element of business for the industry. Huge expenditure is devoted to public infrastructure projects and effective competition is essential to achieve value for money and appropriate use of public funds. The World Bank estimates that Governments worldwide spend US$9.5 trillion in public contracts every year. What role is there for arbitration in resolving tender disputes? In this post, we address review procedures for public procurement derived from international sources, arbitration of disputes arising from contractual tender procedures, and consider how arbitration rules could be adapted to suit the particular requirements of bid challenge disputes. The post addresses issues considered in more detail in a new chapter to Kluwer Law’s International Construction Arbitration to be published in its 3rd edition in February 2021.


Public procurement review procedures

Mechanisms for review of public procurement procedures provided for under international sources such as the Government Procurement Agreement (the GPA), UNCITRAL Model Law, and EU Procurement Directives provide for some level of judicial review, but make no express reference to arbitration. Instead, generic reference is made to independent review bodies coupled with ultimate review by the courts. States are generally left free to determine the nature of domestic challenge mechanisms, to enable alignment with existing national laws and legal systems. National public law, for example, may require decisions relating to the conduct of public bodies to be determined exclusively by way of judicial review before the national courts. In these circumstances, an arbitral tribunal will have no jurisdiction. Indeed, public policy may ordain transparency of decision-making and accountability in relation to public expenditure be secured in a public process as opposed to a confidential arbitration process. Foreign bidders, however, may be sceptical about the independence of national review bodies and prefer international arbitration with a neutral panel. Attempts at redress for tender decisions have been the subject of investment treaty arbitrations. However, demonstrating a qualifying investment has proven challenging where no contract has been awarded.


Arbitration of contractual obligations to tender contracts

It is common for obligations to run competitive tenders to be imposed on concessionaires responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of public infrastructure and operators under production sharing contracts (PSCs) for the exploitation of natural resources. Disputes may arise regarding the manner of award of such contracts, such that aggrieved bidders may bring a complaint. Alternatively, the State entity awarding the concession or PSC may claim that procedures adopted by the concessionaire/operator were in breach of contract. Such disputes are commonly subject to arbitration.

In November 2020, reference to an ICC arbitration award addressing tender disputes reached the public domain. The arbitration was between Doula International Terminal (DIT) and the Autonomous Port of Doula (APD), and arose under a container terminal concession for the Port of Doula in Cameroon. Press reports indicate that the disputes that arose under the concession agreement relate both to the sharing of parking rights and the exclusion of DIT from participating in the tender procedure for a replacement concessionaire launched by APD in January 2018. The ICC tribunal ordered APD to pay DIT damages and to re-issue an open tender notice including DIT. In parallel, DIT’s shareholders commenced proceedings in the Cameroonian courts to challenge the irregularity of the tender procedure and the illegality of the public company implemented by APD to operate the container terminal in place of DIT.


A proposal for a tribunal-based system as an adjunct to the Courts in the UK

In December 2020, the UK Government published a Green Paper entitled ‘Transforming Public Procurement’ (the Green Paper) which proposes reform to Court procedures and investigation of the possibility for establishing a tribunal-based system for a subset of procurement challenges. This subset includes “low value claims or challenges to process on an ongoing competition, such as a claim that a specification is discriminatory or that a bidder has been wrongly excluded”. There is potential for referring more cases to a tribunal-based system “should the anticipated benefits of Court reform not be realised”. There is no express reference to arbitration in the Green Paper and it remains to be seen what system is proposed for this purpose.


Adapting arbitration for the resolution of tender disputes

The need for speed

There are significant challenges in designing arbitration procedures appropriate for the resolution of tender disputes, not least the need for speed. When a bidder is informed that it has not been successful in a tender procedure, its principal concern will be to try and stop the entry into the contract so that the procurement can be rerun. Arbitral procedures can and are designed to allow for expedition. The appointment of emergency arbitrators is contemplated under institutional rules such as those of the ICC and LCIA. Alternatively, a standing panel of arbitrators with appropriate expertise could be constituted to hear bid challenge disputes on an urgent basis. The arbitration rules would need to be tailored to accommodate emergency applications for urgent relief and provide for fast-track resolution of the substantive dispute where the suspension of the contract award is ordered.


Disclosure of relevant information

A difficulty frequently faced by losing bidders is obtaining information regarding the reasons for the decision to assess the merits of bringing a claim. In some jurisdictions such as Germany, the tender file for public procurements is made available to the bidders, but in others such as England, the losing bidder is dependent on a debrief by the awarding entity and its willingness to provide further information in response to questions. Where the information is not forthcoming, the losing bidder has to apply for disclosure. Interestingly, the Green Paper proposes increased transparency in the procurement regime to provide bidders with “immediate and more comprehensive access to much of the information that might be sought under a traditional disclosure process”.1)Ibid at para 197. jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_2249_1").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_2249_1", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); This suggests that applications for disclosure may not be necessary or may be more limited in scope than is currently the position. Clear provisions for establishing confidentiality rings in bespoke arbitration rules would also be of benefit to manage the disclosure, production, and deployment of confidential information.


Joinder of the winning bidder and interested parties?

Should the winning bidder be joined to an arbitration? Ideally, arbitral procedures would allow for such joinder, given the winning bidder has an obvious interest in the outcome of the dispute and will want to ensure protection of its confidential information. While the winning bidder’s interests may be essentially aligned with the awarding authority’s, those interests may diverge on questions such as the extent of disclosure to be made and, if a contract is ordered to be set aside, the consequences that flow.


Public proceedings and publication of awards

The GPA requires that the procedure for review of tender decisions within the scope of the GPA must provide for public hearings or, in the alternative, allow for decisions of a first review body to be subject to judicial review. The GPA does not limit the circumstances in which decisions can be judicially reviewed. In order to be compatible with the GPA, therefore, any review carried out by an arbitral tribunal would have to either: (i) allow for hearings to take place in public (as well as complying with the other procedural requirements in the GPA); and/or (ii) allow for any arbitral award to be subject to judicial review. Where the law of the seat or indeed any institutional rules governing the arbitration only allow for arbitral awards to be judicially reviewed in certain circumstances (e.g., where the tribunal has acted beyond its jurisdiction), the review process would arguably be non-compliant with the GPA.

Of course, it is well-known that the ICC from January 2019 has changed the approach to publication of its awards. The default now is that awards will be published two years after notification to the parties unless either party objects. This practice goes some way to addressing the above transparency concerns. The ICC rules, however, would still arguably not be fully compliant with the GPA given that the rules exclude appeals on a point of law and accordingly limit the scope of judicial review.


State Aid, Public Law, and Competition Law

Tender disputes may be coupled with challenges in relation to unlawful state aid, breach of public law, and competition law. In developed legal systems, bodies other than arbitral tribunals may have jurisdiction to address such issues. As noted above, for example, typically the courts have jurisdiction to address questions of breach of public law. These jurisdictional issues are not fatal to an arbitration process but would need to be addressed when devising bespoke arbitration rules where there is a potential overlap with public law, state aid, and competition.


The answer posed by this blog post is clear – there is undoubtedly a role for arbitration in tender disputes. Such role holds potential for further development, including the development of suitable rules adapted to be fit for purpose.

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ Ibid at para 197. function footnote_expand_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").show(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("-"); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").hide(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("+"); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container() { if (jQuery("#footnote_references_container").is(":hidden")) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container(); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery("#" + p_str_TargetID); if(l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight/2 }, 1000); } }More from our authors: International Arbitration and the COVID-19 Revolution
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Arbitral Tribunals Beware: Better Keep an Eye on Potential Corruption Involving Consent Awards

Fri, 2021-01-29 00:02

The dispute involving the State of Libya and French company SORELEC was heard by the Paris Court of Appeal in the context of a much lower tolerance for bribery and corruption in domestic and international affairs than ever before. France has indeed significantly strengthened its anti-corruption framework since adopting the so-called “Sapin II” law in December 2016, introducing mandatory anti-corruption programs for large companies, and creating a deferred prosecution agreement instrument which the French prosecutorial services have employed in a series of landmark cases since then. On 17 November 2020, the Paris Court of Appeal provided yet another example of its strong inclination to scrutinize awards relating to facts where corruption is suspected to have occurred, and provides new insight regarding its approach to such matters.



In 1979, the Education Ministry of the State of Libya and SORELEC entered into a contract for various construction works. In 1985, a dispute arose and after several failed attempts to settle, SORELEC brought the ICC arbitration proceedings against the State of Libya, claiming €109 million in damages plus interest. On 27 and 29 March 2016 – at an advanced stage of the proceedings – the parties reached yet another settlement (“the Protocol”) providing that (i) the State of Libya would pay SORELEC €230 million within 45 days from notice and (ii) that the State’s failure to pay in the allocated time would result in another award being issued against the State, ordering it to pay €452,042,452.85 in damages (i.e., SORELEC’s initial claim in the arbitration together with interest). The Protocol was signed for the State of Libya by Mr. Omran, the Justice Minister of the provisional government of Libya at the time.

SORELEC requested on 22 August 2016 that the arbitral tribunal render an award reflecting such agreement. In a partial award dated 20 December 2017, the tribunal approved the Protocol and thus issued an award ordering the State of Libya to pay €230 million within 45 days from notice. Following the State of Libya’s failure to pay, a second award was rendered on 10 April 2018.

The State of Libya brought annulment proceedings against both awards, respectively on 26 January and 10 April 2018, alleging amongst other matters that the awards violated international public policy by enforcing a contract obtained through bribes of a public official, and succeeded in having the first award set aside by the Paris Court of Appeal. Indeed, the State of Libya alleged that there was “serious, precise, and concurring evidence” sufficient to demonstrate that the Protocol was obtained by unlawful means.


The Paris Court’s Analysis

When controlling the regularity of the award with respect to international public policy, the Paris Court of Appeal applied what is now seen as its typical approach, using “red flags” of corruption, or, in other words, identifying signs of potential corruption in order to uncover a corrupt practice.1)Belokon (CA Paris, 21 February 2017), Rev. Arb. 2017 (3) p. 915, Alexander Brothers (CA Paris, 10 April 2018), Indrago C. Cass, 1st civil 13 September 2017 no. 16-25.657 jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_8934_1").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_8934_1", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); Reaffirming the existence of an international consensus on the definition and incrimination of acts of corruption of public officials, namely the practice of offering a public official an undue advantage (referring to the OECD Convention of 1997 and the UN Merida Convention of 2003), the Court conducted an in-depth analysis of all the circumstantial evidence submitted by the State of Libya to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that corruption had occurred.

The political context as an indicator of corruption

The Court meticulously noted that when the Protocol was agreed, Libya was in the midst of a civil war between the two competing factions and that both national and international organizations had reported that corruption was pervasive in Libya at that time. The Protocol had been agreed during “this chaotic period“, in circumstances that were particularly favourable to corruption.

Evidence of corruption in the Protocol itself

  • The bypassing of normal procedures

Under Libyan Law, a Minister cannot settle a dispute without prior notification of the State’s Litigation Department. The Court noted that this process was not complied with, which gave rise to a suspicion that Mr. Omran, who executed the Protocol on behalf of Libya, directly or indirectly received a bribe – Mr. Omran having himself acknowledged the duty to follow certain procedures. This was therefore considered a “serious and precise indicator of collusion with SORELEC“, and all the more so bearing in mind Mr. Omran’s implication in the Ghenia case where an Award rendered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and dated 9 December 2016 was retracted by the arbitral tribunal following similar corruption allegations.

  • The absence of evidence documenting the negotiation process immediately before execution of the Protocol

The Court noted that the parties had failed to settle their dispute for over a decade, and that their positions in the arbitration were strongly antagonistic. Moreover, a commission responsible for conducting the negotiations, which Mr. Omran personally appointed, issued a report a couple of months before the Protocol was signed recommending that the dispute be settled for a principal amount of €59.4 million.

Although the preamble of the Protocol stipulated that negotiations were difficult and lasted over a week, a handful of documents submitted by SORELEC did not amount to satisfactory evidence of a genuine negotiation.

  • The specific terms of the Protocol

In view of the State of Libya’s political situation as well as its public finances at the time, the undertakings from the Protocol were held to be inconsistent with the state of Libya’s public finances at the time.

The absence of any concessions from SORELEC and the “striking difference” between the terms of the Protocol and the various documents issued by other State commissions prior to the Protocol, indicated an absence of economic or a political incentive to enter into this agreement, especially considering the advanced stage of the arbitral proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded that Mr. Omran knowingly accepted terms that were obviously detrimental to the interests of Libya and that such acceptance could only be explained by the fact that he had accepted a bribe.

In light of the serious, precise, and concurring evidence that the Protocol had in fact dissimulated a corrupt scheme between SORELEC and Mr. Omran, the partial award rendered on 20 December 2017 was set aside.

In Alexander Brothers, the Court of Appeal had previously described the type of circumstantial evidence that could be taken into account to prove corruption. The SORELEC case provides additional guidance in this respect, and also relates to a different type of agreement (a settlement, rather than an intermediary broker arrangement).


What Is Expected of Arbitral Tribunals?

The decision maintains the keystone solution that the corruption of foreign public officials is offensive to international public policy. As a result, the French courts are under a duty to examine, both in fact and in law, the legality of agreements and whether the recognition or enforcement in France of awards violates international public policy in a “manifest, effective and concrete manner“. The Court of Appeal, however, provides no guidance as to what is expected of arbitral tribunals. In answer to SORELEC’s argument that the State of Libya had not alleged the payment of bribes before the arbitral tribunal, the Court held that it was under a duty to determine whether or not the award allowed the enforcement of an illicit act, irrespective of the parties’ arguments raised before the arbitral tribunal.

In numerous other cases, bribery (or fraud) had been alleged by one of the parties during the arbitration.2)Belokon (CA Paris, 21 February 2017), Rev. Arb. 2017 (3) p. 915, Alexander Brothers (CA Paris, 10 April 2018), Indrago C. Cass, 1st civil 13 September 2017 no. 16-25.657 jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_8934_2").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_8934_2", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); In some instances, criminal proceedings running in parallel to the arbitration made it especially difficult for the arbitral tribunal to ignore the allegations and dismiss them.

In SORELEC, the parties had made it difficult in practice for the arbitral tribunal to investigate the matter, given that they applied for consent award. There are, nevertheless, arguments in favor of more intervention on the tribunal’s part.

The first relates to the enforceability of the award itself. It is generally considered that arbitral tribunals are to render awards that are enforceable (see, for instance, Article 42 of the ICC Rules), and failing to investigate further in case of concerns about potential corruption could be taken as a breach of that duty.

The role of arbitration in the general justice system should also be borne in mind. Given the very efficient enforcement of arbitral awards (to illustrate, in France, exequatur is obtained ex parte and allows for the immediate seizure of assets), it is difficult to consider that arbitrators should not be mindful of giving effect to agreements obtained through corrupt practices. In SORELEC, the tribunal was indeed manipulated by the parties to carry out their corrupt scheme.

Even if arbitral tribunals prove reluctant to investigate such matters of their own motion for a number of reasons,3)See S. Bollée Rev Crit DIP 95(1) jan-mar 2006 p.104 jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_8934_3").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_8934_3", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] }); the SORELEC case should undoubtedly encourage arbitral tribunals to exercise extra caution in circumstances that raise, or should raise, concerns such as those in this particular case.4)For a detailed analysis, see Rapport sur la responsabilité de l’arbitre, Club des juristes 2017 jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_8934_4").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_8934_4", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] });

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ Belokon (CA Paris, 21 February 2017), Rev. Arb. 2017 (3) p. 915, Alexander Brothers (CA Paris, 10 April 2018), Indrago C. Cass, 1st civil 13 September 2017 no. 16-25.657 2. ↑ Belokon (CA Paris, 21 February 2017), Rev. Arb. 2017 (3) p. 915, Alexander Brothers (CA Paris, 10 April 2018), Indrago C. Cass, 1st civil 13 September 2017 no. 16-25.657 3. ↑ See S. Bollée Rev Crit DIP 95(1) jan-mar 2006 p.104 4. ↑ For a detailed analysis, see Rapport sur la responsabilité de l’arbitre, Club des juristes 2017 function footnote_expand_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").show(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("-"); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").hide(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("+"); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container() { if (jQuery("#footnote_references_container").is(":hidden")) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container(); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery("#" + p_str_TargetID); if(l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight/2 }, 1000); } }More from our authors: International Arbitration and the COVID-19 Revolution
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International Law Talk Podcast and Arbitration: Does the International Arbitration Community Need Minimum Civility Standards? A Dialogue with Abby Cohen Smutny

Thu, 2021-01-28 01:42

International Law Talk is a series of podcasts through which Wolters Kluwer provides the latest news and industry insights from thought leaders and experts in the fields of International Arbitration, IP Law, International Tax Law, and Competition Law. Here at Kluwer Arbitration Blog, we highlight the podcasts focused on international arbitration. In this latest episode, Kiran Nasir Gore, Associate Editor of Kluwer Arbitration Blog, interviews Abby Cohen Smutny, Global Head of White & Case’s International Arbitration Practice.

With decades of experience in international arbitration, Abby shares her thoughts on various topics, including her commitment to enhancing her work as an arbitration practitioner and advocate through professional activities. In particular, Abby is Co-Chair of the ICCA Task Force on Standards of Practice in International Arbitration (“Task Force”) (with Professor Guido Tawil). Abby discusses the value of professional extra-circular activities to practitioners to maintain perspective on arbitral procedure and practice more broadly. She provides her perspectives on the Task Force’s substantive mandate and goals, highlighting tensions central to practice in a growing and maturing field. The conversation explores:

  • The way the increasing number of practitioners, the increased use of arbitration, and the general maturity of the field have together created a need for common guidelines on civility as a matter of best practice. Abby compares such standards to ones on civility and conduct developed in recent years in national contexts, including by domestic courts.
  • The Task Force’s mandate to develop guidelines that may serve as voluntary benchmarks in arbitration proceedings. In Abby’s view, the Task Force faced the challenge by identifying a common understanding of “civility,” drawing on the experience of practitioners coming from different legal traditions.
  • Abby’s hope that the guidelines (once issued) could help to ensure civility and respect among practitioners and other participants. A challenge of promulgating proposed guidelines is that they are not “rules” of conduct and, thus, they are not coercive and failure to adhere to them is not sanctionable.
  • How practitioners “embody the law” and can help to cement the legitimacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution among users and various stakeholders. In particular, Abby describes the conduct of practitioners as a reflection of the rule of law. On this point, she emphasizes that practitioners must approach their work with a sense of respect, civility, and fairness.
  • The distinction between ethical requirements and guidelines on civility, and relatedly, the fine line between zealous advocacy on behalf of one’s clients and courtesy toward and respect for one’s colleagues. While these concepts dovetail, Abby describes the Task Force’s efforts to balance these competing interests in a manner that does not interfere with practitioners’ obligations to their clients.

While the ICCA Task Force on Standards of Practice in International Arbitration has not issued its final guidelines yet, Abby hopes that the guidelines could provide a “soft reminder” and objective basis to the arbitration community and other participants to manage their own conduct. She further hopes that arbitration institutions, law firms, tribunals, and/or parties could endorse and reference the guidelines and that they become a reflection of industry best practice.

As a final thought, Abby opines that the continual improvement of process and procedure is healthy, as innovation and evolution is necessary for the field and community to continue thriving.




Listen to the podcast “Does the International Arbitration Community Need Minimum Civility Standards?” with Abby Cohen Smutny.

The International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) is an NGO dedicated to promoting the greater understanding and use of international dispute resolution processes globally. Its activities include convening the biennial ICCA Congress, publishing authoritative dispute resolution publications (including the ICCA Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, the ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, and the ICCA Congress Series), and convening outreach and research projects on contentious or cutting-edge areas of international arbitral practice. ICCA’s publications are available on Kluwer Arbitration.


Follow the coverage of the International Law Talk arbitration podcasts on Kluwer Arbitration Blog here.

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Arbitrators: Immunity, Conflicts and New Challenges – Revisiting the ITA-ALARB Americas Workshop

Tue, 2021-01-26 23:53

The ITA (Institute for Transnational Arbitration) – ALARB (Latin American Society of Arbitration) Americas Workshop took place virtually on 2-4 December 2020. The conference focused on the role of arbitrators, their liabilities, challenges, and the need for increased diversity efforts.

The conference was co-chaired by Julie Bédard (Skadden, New York), and Maria Inés Corrá (Bomchil, Buenos Aires), and consisted of five panels, an open forum, and networking sessions.


The conference began with a panel entitled “Fernando Cantuarias Salaverry’s Paradigmatic case,” moderated by Estefanía Ponce (Posse Herrera Ruiz, Bogota). Alfredo Bullard (Bullard Falla Ezcurra, Lima) and Mario Reggiardo (Payet, Rey, Cauvi, Pérez Abogados, Lima) explained the case. Mr. Cantuarias participated as arbitrator in an ad hoc proceeding in 2012 between Odebrecht and the Ministry of Transportation concerning additional costs in a highway construction in the Peruvian Amazon. The tribunal ordered the payment of USD 23 million to Odebrecht, as approved by the relevant authority overseeing the construction. A preliminary investigation began against the arbitrators for allegedly having received a disguised bribe from Odebrecht through increased arbitrator fees. In that context, Mr. Cantuarias was incarcerated in Peru in early November 2019, and then released weeks later.



Members of the Peruvian arbitral community filed an amicus curiae in the criminal proceeding explaining the flaws in the prosecution’s case. They observed that the 2019 fees of the Lima Chamber of Commerce were not applicable to a 2012 ad hoc proceeding, and that the fees were reasonable under Peruvian law considering the complexity and amount in dispute. Several institutions and associations submitted briefs regarding Mr. Cantuarias’ record in the field and comparing the arbitrator fees for the same amount in dispute under various other institutions, which would have been significantly higher than those received by Mr. Cantuarias. Mr. Cantuarias’ prosecution continues in Peru, as do investigations in other cases involving alleged corruption by Brazilian companies known as “Operação Lava Jato” or “Operation Car Wash”.


Karima Sauma (CICA, Costa Rica) moderated a panel surveying immunity of arbitrators and the use of constitutional actions in Latin America. Leonardo de Castro Coelho (Mattos Filho, Brazil), María Angélica Burgos (Baker McKenzie, Bogota), María del Mar Herrera (EY, Central America), and Michael Fernández (Winston & Strawn, New York) shared their perspectives.



The survey suggested that since recent arbitration laws in Latin America follow the UNCITRAL Model Law, they also lack specific provisions or exclusions on arbitrators’ liability. In Brazil, arbitrators are subject to criminal liability under the strict standard for judges requiring, for example, a wrongdoing performed with intent or fraud. In jurisdictions with separate regulations for domestic and international arbitrations, such as Colombia, arbitrators may be subject to disciplinary proceedings in only domestic arbitrations. In El Salvador claims may be brought against arbitrators and institutions for damage caused to the parties.

In the United States, arbitrators and institutions are immune from civil cases due to their quasi-judicial role. Arbitrators are generally immune from testifying, and are only exceptionally deposed in vacatur proceedings based on fraud, misconduct, or corruption implicating the opposing party or one or more of the arbitrators.

In Latin American jurisdictions, constitutional actions including mandado de segurança, amparo, and tutela are very exceptional against awards or the process towards the award, and could rarely proceed against arbitrators.


The second day began with a keynote speech on arbitrators’ immunity and liability by Eduardo Zuleta (Zuleta Legal, Bogota). A panel followed, moderated by Calvin Hamilton (Independent Arbitrator), with Eduardo Silva-Romero (Dechert, Paris), Valeria Galíndez (Galíndez Arb, Sao Paulo), and María del Carmen Tovar (Estudio Echecopar, Lima).



Mr. Zuleta explained that while domestic laws rarely refer to arbitrators’ liability, some assimilate arbitrators to judges or consider arbitration a contractual issue. Contractual arrangements (such as limiting liability in the terms of reference) and indemnities in arbitration rules would not be a standing solution without involving the applicable local law in assessing the validity of the limitation. He proposed limiting liability for adjudicative and non-adjudicative functions to protect arbitrators from claims intended to harass them and to implement rules designed to prevent the parties from relitigating certain issues. Mr. Zuleta proposed that gross negligence or willful misconduct should be the liability standard for the adjudicative function. If the standard was lower, the arbitrator could be liable for an annulled award. A standard of professional due diligence would apply to duties such as disclosure, independence, impartiality, and confidentiality.

Mr. Silva-Romero highlighted that limitations of liability clash with Latin American laws that prohibit the waiver of future claims for willful misconduct or that equate gross negligence to willful misconduct. Ms. Galíndez recalled cases where arbitrators had to reimburse fees and expressed concern over possible orders to compensate for lost opportunities or moral damages. Ms. Tovar mentioned that the key should be preserving the independence of arbitrators and institutions and protecting the award.

The panel addressed the relationship between the validity of the award and the arbitrators’ liability. While a set aside proceeding against the award does not necessarily involve arbitrator negligence, it might entail an assumption of negligence, that the arbitrator is wrong, and that the court is always right. Such exposure to liability for misapplication of the law could prevent arbitrators from acting in certain jurisdictions. Mr. Silva-Romero warned that, as in ICSID annulment proceedings, there must be an “egregious” error in the application of the law or be equivalent to not applying any law.

The panel agreed that “immunity” limits civil liability but does not address criminal liability. Some pending questions included (i) whether one may simultaneously seek annulment and initiate actions against the arbitrators; (ii) whether there should be a waiver of eventual criminal proceedings; and (iii) how to tackle the lack of knowledge of arbitration rules by a criminal judge that could conclude that a criminal offense was committed.


Prof. Catherine Rogers (Queen Mary University, London) gave a keynote address on the duty of disclosure and conflicts of interest. A panel followed, moderated by Sandra González (Ferrere, Montevideo), with Claudia Salomon (Latham & Watkins, New York), Eduardo Damião Gonçalves (Mattos Filho, São Paulo), Guido Tawil (Independent Arbitrator, Buenos Aires).

Professor Rogers explained that the duty of disclosure is subject to multiple regulations including the IBA Guidelines and the Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement. Difficulties include the use of that binary terms (biased/unbiased, partial/impartial) that prevent nuances and new conflicts such as double-hatting, issue conflicts, conflicts with expert witnesses and third-party funders. Stakeholders apply different standards: (i) arbitrators deciding what to disclose; (ii) parties deciding whether to file a challenge; (iii) institutions as de facto regulators in admitting challenges, establishing disclosure requirements, creating rosters and blacklists, providing for fee reductions, publishing case details; and (iv) courts reviewing awards under national laws or the New York Convention.

Mr. Tawil suggested that the main challenge is to determine what is transparency and what should be disclosed to achieve the standard of transparency. Excessive disclosure might give place to “unfounded and frivolous challenges.” While the IBA Guidelines and the ICC rules provide guidance on what should be disclosed, self-regulation by arbitrators would be preferred. For Mr. Damião an additional challenge is that today’s actions and disclosures may be judged in five years with future standards. Thus, if the door was open to more rules on disclosures, there will always be more rules to come, and strict definitions make sense only in specific cases.

When asked about tools or measures of particular value to address impartiality, Ms. Salomon mentioned the power of arbitrators under the 2021 ICC Rules to exclude new counsel, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. The rule seeks to address cases where counsel might bring in new counsel that would result in one of the arbitrators having a conflict and potentially resigning, which could cause a delay in the arbitration. Mr. Damião Gonçalves mentioned publicity initiatives at the ICC including the publication of awards, the composition of tribunals and counsel, and requiring the parties to give reasons when formulating challenges.


On institutions as de facto authorities, Ms. Salomon mentioned that the clients determine whether more transparency is required, and the system should be responsive to such expectations. Additional guidelines may help to level the expectations of the parties in the process, and arbitrators may have additional layers of duty if they have their own codes of conduct or ethical obligations. ICC Note to Parties and Tribunals mentions what should be disclosed, for example, if the arbitrator has been appointed by the parties or counsel or acted in a related case (¶23). The issue then is if the arbitrators will be challenged after all these facts are disclosed.


Carolyn Lamm (White & Case, Washington DC) moderated a panel addressing gender diversity in arbitration. Alexis Mourre, (President, ICC International Court of Arbitration, Paris), Yas Banifatemi (Shearman & Sterling, Paris), Patricia Kobayashi (CAM-CCBC, São Paulo), Mónica Jiménez (Ecopetrol, Bogota), and Wendy Miles QC (Twenty Essex, London) shared the perspectives of counsel, institutions, clients, and arbitrators.



The panel acknowledged the increase of the appointment of female arbitrators since 2005 and praised initiatives such as the Arbitration Pledge. Arbitral Women and Women Way in Arbitration have also raised awareness on diversity and provided a search base with qualified candidates.

Mr. Mourre highlighted the achievement of gender parity in the ICC Court in 2018. He called for an effort on education, since diversity is broader than gender diversity. The 2019 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics indicated that women represent 21% of arbitrators in ICC arbitrations. Regional diversity remains limited, as 66% of arbitrators are from Western countries, a figure that has remained relatively stable in recent years. He urged a deeper consideration of the career lives of women and the role of counsel in choosing arbitrators. What is imposed on attorneys at law firms may be a major element of discrimination, and helping young women to achieve a balance between work and personal responsibilities should be part of the solution.

Ms. Banifatemi encouraged a conscious and systemic among counsel to ensure that women represent at least half of the individuals in each list of arbitrator candidates. She observed that only 20% of ICSID arbitrators are women and 47% of ICSID arbitrators are from Western countries. Within law firms, a structurally diverse arbitration personnel will occur with diversity in exposure, mentorships, recruitment, and promotions. Ms. Kobayashi shared the institutional perspective, explaining the CAM-CCBC’s commitment to have at least 30% women in conferences, appointments, and lists of arbitrators.

Ms. Jiménez stressed the need to commit clients in the appointment process, presenting lists of female candidates and informing them of diversity initiatives. Explicit diversity policies may be incorporated in arbitration clauses and even in the bylaws, as she shared her experience of both of those practices at Ecopetrol. Ms. Miles suggested the creation of webinars interviewing female practitioners, including local experts in topics that arise in arbitrations involving such discrete issues as the environment, indigenous communities, and human rights.


A final informal open forum was co-moderated by Cecilia Azar (Galicia, Mexico) and Tai Heng-Cheng (Sidley, New York). Participants discussed changes during the pandemic, sharing experiences in virtual hearings with participants in different time-zones, challenges to cross interrogate virtually, and changes in organizations, including remote work, and how to continue with the training process of younger associates.


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